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Before and After Hinckley:  Legal Insanity in the United States 
Stephen J. Morse 
Introduction 
 This chapter first considers the direction of the affirmative defense of legal insanity in the 
United States before John Hinckley was acquitted by reason of insanity in 1982 for attempting to 
assassinate President Reagan and others and the immediate aftermath of that acquittal.  Since the 
middle of the 20th Century, the tale is one of the rise and fall of the American Law Institute’s 
Model Penal Code test for legal insanity.1  Then it turns to the constitutional decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court concerning the status of legal insanity.  Finally, it addresses the 
substantive and procedural changes that have occurred in the insanity defense since the wave of 
legal changes following the Hinckley decision. 
Before and in the Wake of Hinckley 
 The affirmative defense of legal insanity has always been controversial, but every state 
had some form of the defense until the time of Hinckley.  In the early part of the 20th C, a few 
states tried to abolish the defense legislatively,2 but all such attempts were rejected by the states’ 
appellate courts.  After M’Naghten,3 virtually all United States jurisdictions adopted some form 
of the English cognitive test, although starting with the Parsons4 case in Alabama, a minority of 
jurisdictions also adopted a control5 test in addition to the M’Naghten standard.  There were of 
course criticisms of M’Naghten.  It was allegedly too inflexible because its test is expressed in 
all-or-none-terms, too unscientific, and unduly limited the scope of expert testimony.  In 
practice, however, most of these alleged flaws were unproblematic.  Experts were not unduly 
cabined, and there is no evidence that the test was applied narrowly as a result of its narrow 
language.  It was of course open to the criticism that an independent control test was necessary.  
Nonetheless, M’Naghten remained the dominant test until the second half of the 20th Century.  
Jurisdictions were given great freedom to allocate the burden of persuasion at any level, 
including requiring the defendant to prove legal insanity beyond a reasonable doubt,6 thus 
increasing the risk of wrongful conviction.  Jurisdictions were permitted to place the persuasion 
burden on the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant met the production 
burden, and most did so. 
 
1 The American Law Institute is a private, non-profit organization of lawyers, judges, law professors and others 
dedicated to reform of various areas of the law. 
2 See State v. Lange, 123 So. 639, 641-42 (La. 1929) (finding a violation of the state due process clause); Sinclair v. 
State, 132 So. 581, 584-87 (Miss. 1931) (finding a violation of the federal due process, equal protection, and cruel 
and unusual punishment clauses); State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1023-24 (Wash. 
1910) (finding a violation of the state due process clause). 
3 Cl. & Fin. 718, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). 
4 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577 (1887). 
5 These tests are sometimes referred to as “irresistible impulse” or “volitional” tests, but both alternatives sow 
confusion for various reasons.  “Control” is a preferrable generic term that I shall use throughout this chapter. 
6 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); re-aff’d, Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976). 
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 In 1952, the American Law Institute (ALI) began work in earnest on the Model Penal 
Code (MPC), an attempt to bring order, rigor and precision to the common law of crimes.  After 
the publication of numerous preliminary drafts, a final official draft was published in 1962.  Its 
insanity defense provision is as follows: 
Section 4.01. Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility. 
  (1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a 
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law. 
  (2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an 
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.7 
The drafters had consulted with mental health professionals and believed the new test was an 
improvement on both M’Naghten and control tests.  It notably included a control prong.  It 
required only lack of substantial capacity, not lack of all capacity to appreciate or to conform. 
Further, its cognitive prong gave law makers the choice between appreciation, not knowledge, of 
criminality (legal appreciation) or of wrongfulness (moral appreciation), and did not focus on 
“knowledge” narrowly conceived. State lawmakers and judges were convinced.  After 
publication of the MPC test, every state that seriously considered insanity defense reform 
legislatively or judicially adopted the MPC test.  There was no uniform federal insanity test 
extant at the time, but before Hinckley, all federal circuits but one had judicially adopted the 
MPC test.  At the time of Hinckley, the MPC test was probably the majority rule. 
 In March, 1982, John W. Hinckley, the 25 year old son of prosperous Colorado family, 
attempted to assassinate President Reagan and others in the District of Columbia.  He was 
charged with attempted murder under both federal and local District law.8  As is often the case, 
the prosecutions were consolidated in the federal district court.  At the time, the MPC test was 
the applicable federal rule in the District of Columbia and the prosecution bore the burden of 
persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt once the production burden had been met.  Both sides 
were represented by excellent attorneys and experts.  There was not profound disagreement 
among the experts about the facts, including those pertaining to Hinckley’s mental state.  The 
crucial question was whether those facts amounted to delusional beliefs or evidence of a 
disturbed but non-delusional agent.  I did not attend the trial, but I did read the complete 
transcript.  In my experience, it is rare for the evidence to be in such exquisite equipoise.  The 
prosecution’s weighty burden of persuasion made it almost inevitable that a proper jury would 
acquit Hinckley by reason of insanity and in June, 1982, they did so. 
 The verdict caused a public uproar.  President Reagan was popular and the insanity 
defense was not.  Many thought that the control prong of the MPC test was the culprit, but there 
 
7 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code & Commentaries, §4.01 (1962, 1985). 
8 Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, the United States Constitution permits successive prosecution in federal and 
local courts for the same criminal acts without violating the double jeopardy clause.  Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 
121 (1959), re-affirm’d, Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019). 
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is no convincing evidence for this allegation.  There were the usual complaints that this was 
another example of the “circus atmosphere” of dueling experts that insanity cases too often 
produced.  And so on.  The result was a wave of legislative reform at the federal and state levels, 
much of it aimed at narrowing and even abolishing the defense.   
The Justice Department and the Attorney General were both initially in favor of 
abolishing the insanity defense in federal criminal trials, but were ultimately convinced that this 
change was too extreme.9  In the event, Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act in 
1984, which for the first time established a uniform federal rule.  The legislation adopted a 
M’Naghten variant that used “appreciation” of the nature and quality of one’s acts or 
wrongfulness, that contained no control test, that  required the necessary mental disorder 
component to be ‘severe,” and that placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant by clear and 
convincing evidence.10  Many states followed suit, typically abolishing a control test, narrowing 
the cognitive substantive test, and allocating the burden or persuasion to the defendant by either a 
preponderance of the evidence or the more onerous clear and convincing standard.11  Five states 
abolished the affirmative defense of legal insanity.  Four of the state supreme courts upheld the 
legislation against constitutional attack, but one held the reform unconstitutional.12   
The triumphal march of the MPC test had come to an end.  The Hinckley verdict had 
done its work.  In the ensuing decades, there were no major changes to the law of legal insanity 
nationwide, although criticism of a narrow cognitive test persisted.  Cases like those of Andrea 
Yates,13 who had drowned her five children in a bathtub in response to the delusion that she 
needed to do so to save them from Satan, increased calls to once again adopt a control test.  Such 
claims made little headway.  Most important, a question the Supreme Court had never answered 
remained open: whether the constitution required some form of the affirmative defense of legal 
insanity.  Three Supreme Court cases addressed the issue, to which we will now turn. 
The Deconstitutionalization of the Affirmative Defense of Legal Insanity 
 
9 I testified twice on behalf of the American Psychological Association concerning what the federal insanity rule 
ought to be.  I know from staffers and some member of the House that abolition was considered too extreme by 
members of both parties in both the legislative and executive branches of government. 
10 18 USC § 17 (1984). 
11 There has been one good study in a sample of states of the naturalistic experiment abolition produced that found 
that narrowing the substantive defense made little difference in outcomes but allocating the burden of persuasion to 
the defendant produced fewer acquittals. H. J.Steadman et al, Before and After Hinckley: Evaluating the Insanity 
Defense Reform (1993). 
 
12 State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990); State v. Bethel, 66 P. 3d 840 (Kan. 2003); State v. Korell, 
690 P. 2d 992 (Mont. 1984); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Ut. 1995).  Finger v. State, 27 P. 3d 66 (Nev. 2001) 
ruled that abolition violated the due process clauses of the United States and Nevada Constitutions. 
 





 The United States Supreme Court is admirably reluctant to interfere with substantive 
criminal law.  The definition of crimes and defenses is largely left to the states and Congress in 
deference to our federal system of government.  The standard trope is that the individual 
jurisdictions are “laboratories” to test the validity of the will of the people expressed through 
legislative enactments, and the Supreme Court should not interfere except in extreme cases.  
Thus, any petitioner making a substantive due process claim that some state statute is 
unconstitutional faces a difficult task to show that the remedy is implicit in ordered liberty or that 
the law “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental.”14  The historical record is a crucial part of this analysis.  
A frequently quoted opinion expressing the Court’s deference to the states in substantive 
criminal law is from Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas,15 in which the Court 
was asked to constitutionalize an affirmative defense for behavior associated with an addiction 
which was allegedly a compulsion symptomatic of the disease.  
We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of the collection of interlocking 
and overlapping concepts which the common law has utilized to assess the moral 
accountability of an individual for his antisocial deeds. The doctrines of actus reus, 
mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided the 
tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims 
of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views 
of the nature of man. This process of adjustment has always been thought to be the 
province of the States.16 
The Court thus refused to adopt such a one-size-fits-all constitutional defense as not fruitful and 
as something that should be left to the province of the states. 
 An unusual exception to the Court’s deference was Robinson v. California.17 Walter 
Lawrence Robinson was a needle-injecting drug addict who was convicted of a California statute 
that made it a crime to "be addicted to the use of narcotics" and he was sentenced to ninety days 
in jail. The only evidence that he was an addict was needle marks.  Robinson appealed to the 
Supreme Court on the ground that punishing him for being an addict was a violation of the 8 th 
and 14th Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.  There were many different 
opinions written in the case, but a majority agreed that punishing for addiction was 
unconstitutional.  (As a sad footnote, Robinson died of an overdose before the case was decided.) 
 It is difficult to determine precisely what reasoning was the foundation for the Court’s 
constitutional conclusion, but for our purposes three stand out: it is unconstitutional to punish for 
status alone or because addiction is a disease or because addiction is “involuntary.”  Herbert 
Fingarette and Anne Fingarette Hasse demonstrated conclusively decades ago that the disease 
rationale collapses into either the status rationale or the involuntariness rationale (1979), so let us 
examine what implications follow from each of these two. The status rationale is far more 
modest and simply builds on the foundational criminal law requirement that criminal liability 
generally requires action (or an intentional omission in appropriate cases).  Robinson was not 
 
14 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790. 798 (1952). 
15 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
16 Ibid. at 536-37 (emphasis added). 
17 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
5 
 
charged with possession or use, but simply with the status of being an addict.  In dissent, Justice 
White pointed out that if it was unfair to punish an addict for his status, why would it not be 
equally unfair to punish him for the actions that are signs of that status.  It is a clever question, 
but it ignores the view of addiction as a chronic and relapsing disorder.  On this view, one can be 
an addict even if one is not using at the moment so there is no action.  Again, the status argument 
is modest because it betokens no genuine widening of non-responsibility conditions.  Indeed, it is 
a narrowing holding because the older common law permitted punishment for prohibited 
statuses. 
The “involuntariness” claim more extensively suggests that punishing people for 
conditions and their associated behaviors that they are helpless to prevent is also 
unconstitutional.  Adopting the involuntariness position would be an invitation to undermining 
the choice model of addiction in light of some powerfully supported arguments that use by 
addicts is indeed a choice.  More important, if the Court adopted an “involuntariness” defense, it 
could not be limited to addiction-related behavior. 
Those who wanted to test the meaning of Robinson did not have long to wait because 
Powell v. Texas settled the issue just six years later.  Leroy Powell was a chronic alcoholic who 
spent all his money on wine and who had been frequently arrested and convicted for public 
drunkenness.  We have already seen that the Court rejected constitutionalizing a control test in 
Powell, but the Powell plurality made clear that Robinson should not be read extensively as 
based on an involuntariness rationale.  Instead, it was simply based on the rationale that the 
Constitution does not permit punishment for status alone.18  Culpable action was required before 
the state could justifiably blame and punish.  There have been attempts since then to claim that 
Justice White’s confusing concurrence,19 which envisioned some circumstances in which a 
constitutional excuse might be required, should be read as the holding of Powell.20  These 
attempts have been fruitless to date, but claims based on accumulating scientific knowledge 
might motivate further such attempts.  In short, as of 1968, there was no definitive statement 
from the high court about the constitutionality of some form of the insanity defense. 
That status quo did not change in 2006 when the Court decided Clark v. Arizona.21 In the 
early morning of June 21, 2000, Eric Clark, a 17 year-old resident of Flagstaff, Arizona, was riding 
around in his pickup truck blaring loud music.  Responding to complaints about the noise, Officer 
Jeffrey Moritz, who was in uniform, turned on the emergency lights and siren of his marked patrol 
car and pulled Clark over.  Moritz left the patrol car and told Clark to remain where he was.  Less 
than a minute later, Clark shot and killed Moritz.  Clark was charged with intentionally killing a 
police officer knowing that the officer was acting in the line of duty.22 
 Clark did not contest the shooting and death.  But he did claim he was suffering from 
paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the crime.  He claimed both that his mental disorder negated 
the required mens rea for the crime charged (because he lacked the intent to kill a person and the 
 
18 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968). 
19 Ibid. at 548.  
20 Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F. 3d. 264 (4th Cir. 2019).  The case ultimately settled, however, so there was no 
definitive opinion on the issue. 
21 548 U.S. 735 (2006). 
 
22 All statements of the facts are taken from the Supreme Court opinion. 
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knowledge that the victim was a police officer) and that in any event disorder rendered him legally 
insane. 
  
There was substantial evidence to suggest that Clark knew Moritz was a police officer and 
that he had planned just such a shooting, including Clark’s statements to classmates a few weeks 
earlier that he wanted to shoot police officers.  He had even arguably lured Officer Moritz by 
driving his truck with its radio blaring in a residential area.  On the other hand, Clark presented 
testimony from family, classmates and school officials about his bizarre behavior during the 
preceding year, including rigging his bedroom with fishing line, beads and chimes to warn him of 
intruders, and keeping a bird in his car to warn him of airborne poison.  These actions were 
plausibly a result of his paranoid delusions.  Indeed, lay and expert testimony reported that Clark 
thought Flagstaff was populated with “aliens,” including some that were impersonating police 
officers, that the aliens were trying to kill him, and that only bullets could stop the aliens.  The 
defense expert also testified that Clark had turned the radio up to drown out auditory hallucinations. 
  
The operative Arizona legal insanity test under which Clark was tried was limited to the 
cognitive right/wrong test: once the burden of production was met, the defendant had the burden 
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that “at the time of the commission of the criminal 
act [he] was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that [he] did not know the 
criminal act was wrong.”23    
Clark argued that the full M’Naghten rule was the minimum test necessary to satisfy due 
process and that Arizona’s truncated test was therefore unconstitutional.  Writing for the five-
Justice majority, Justice Souter rejected this claim, concluding that the full M’Naghten rule is not 
a fundamental principle of justice subsumed by the due process clause.24    
The Court correctly noted that the history of legal insanity defenses in this country 
demonstrates that there is substantial diversity of language and interpretation within the broad 
cognitive and control categories   As Justice Souter pointed out, insanity definitions vary widely 
across the United States, and four states had abolished the defense entirely. The Court also 
observed that the test for legal insanity is not a test for mental disorder.  The tests for insanity and 
disorder have been devised for different purposes—assessing criminal responsibility and justifying 
mental health treatment—and there is controversy about both.  This is inevitable because the test 
for legal insanity is a matter of policy.  The Court concluded that because there is so much 
variation, “no particular formulation has evolved into a baseline for due process, and…the insanity 
rule, like the conceptualization of criminal offenses, is substantially open to state choice.”25 
Although reasonable people might believe that Arizona’s truncated insanity test is not 
optimally just, the Court’s holding on this issue—that due process does not require “any single 
 
 
23 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., Sec. 13-502(A) (West 2001). 
 
24 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined Justice 
Souter’s majority opinion. Justice Breyer concurred in the majority’s analysis. 
25 Ibid. at 752. 
7 
 
canonical formulation of legal insanity”26—seems plainly right. But in the course of reaching this 
rather unremarkable conclusion, the Court may have confounded the two M’Naghten prongs.   
In its original characterization of the disjunctive M’Naghten rule, as well as in its 
categorization of types of insanity rules, it referred to knowledge of the nature and quality of one’s 
act as a question of “cognitive capacity” and knowledge of right and wrong as a question of “moral 
capacity.”27  But, in fact, both are cognitive questions, and indeed that is why both are usually 
alternative prongs of cognitive tests such as M’Naghten.  They differ only in the object of the 
knowledge required.  Moreover, mental disorder seldom disables a person’s moral compass.   The 
person may be making a “moral mistake” because his or her perceptions and beliefs are distorted 
by disorder, but the moral sense generally remains intact.  Andrea Yates might genuinely have 
thought her behavior was morally justified, but her moral capacity was hardly disabled.  Indeed, 
one could view her act as an indication that her moral sense was perfectly intact, albeit driven by 
a delusional belief. 
The Court also consistently referred to control tests as “volitional” and characterized them 
as asking “whether a person was so lacking in volition due to a mental defect or illness that he 
could not have controlled his actions.”28  It is common to refer to control tests as volitional, but,  
this is a confused locution that should be abandoned.  Whether Clark thought he was killing an 
alien to save himself or thought he was killing an officer because he was angry at the police, his 
volition or will perfectly and competently executed the intention he formed.  Yates perfectly 
executed her intention to kill, motivated by her desire to save the children from Satan’s eternal 
torments.  Both may have experienced grave difficulty conforming to the law because they suffered 
profound delusions about the nature of the world, but in neither case was a defect of the will the 
source of the problem. 
The Court also decided that the narrow Arizona legal insanity rule was constitutionally 
acceptable because evidence of so-called cognitive incapacity—lack of knowledge of what one 
was doing—is relevant to the right/wrong test and has the same significance for both.  The Court 
recognized that one might show lack of moral knowledge without showing lack of factual 
knowledge about what one was doing, but it correctly observed that lack of the latter was almost 
always sufficient to show lack of moral knowledge.29  After all, if the agent does not know what 
he is doing, he cannot know that it is right or wrong.  Indeed, the Court interpreted Arizona’s 
legislative narrowing of the rule as a “streamlining”30 change rather than a genuinely substantive 
 
 
26 Ibid. at 753 
27 Ibid. at 747, 753-754. 
 
28 Ibid. at 749. 
29 Contrary to the Court’s assertion, it is quite possible that a defendant might not know what he or she was doing but 
would know that it was wrong.  For example, suppose a defendant violently attacked a person with the belief that the 
person was a dog.  See Joseph Livermore & Paul E. Meehl, The Virtues of M’Naghten,  51 MINN. L. REV. 769, 809 
(1967).  In such a case, the defendant would not know what he or she was doing, but would know that cruelty to 
animals was a moral and legal wrong.  It is not clear from Clark’s reasoning if a rule like Arizona’s that produced 
such an outcome would be constitutional because the Court did not envisage this possibility.  There is a serious 
question about whether such a rule would permit unjust blame and punishment.  Nevertheless, although such cases 
are a theoretical possibility, they will be so rare that the Court’s analysis is reasonable.  See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 
735, 753-755 and n. 24. 
30 Ibid. at 755,. 24 
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alteration. Even under the narrow rule, then, all evidence of lack of factual knowledge would 
apparently be relevant and admissible, as it was at trial. 
Before we leave Clark, we should take note of the case’s other important holding: a state 
was free to exclude all expert evidence of mental disorder to negate mens rea, as Arizona did.  A 
state had to allow introduction of observational evidence of mental disorder, whether from lay 
people or experts on the mens rea issue, but expert evidence about mental disorder generally and 
the defendant’s capacities could constitutionally be excluded.  The Court noted that Arizona was 
free to “channel”31 all such expert evidence into the issue of legal insanity.  In its discussion of the 
mens rea issue, the Court sometimes confused the mens rea issue with legal insanity.  It is true that 
the same evidence may often support claims that mens rea is negated and that the defendant is 
legally insane, but they are nonetheless legally distinct with equally distinct consequences.  Mens 
rea negation is a denial of the prima facie case that can lead to outright acquittal; legal insanity is 
an affirmative defense that leads to a form of involuntary civil commitment to a forensic facility.  
I raise this mens rea issue because the same confusion about the relation between mens rea and 
legal insanity bedeviled both the ancient authorities and the Supreme Court majority effectively 
upholding the complete abolition of the defense of legal insanity in Kahler v. Kansas,32 which will 
be discussed below. 
Whether a jurisdiction could constitutionally both abolish the insanity defense and exclude 
expert testimony on mens rea was unclear because Arizona did have an insanity defense, even if 
it was the narrowest in the nation.  Thus, the effect of mental disorder on culpability assessment 
was not completely forbidden.  In holding that Arizona’s very narrow legal insanity formulation 
was constitutional, the Court took no position on whether a jurisdiction had to have some form of 
an affirmative defense.  The case did not present that question.  But Delling v. Idaho did. 
In late March and early April 2007, John Joseph Delling planned and committed the 
intentional homicide of two people he believed were stealing his “aura” and “powers.”  He further 
believed that he needed to kill the victims to prevent the victims from harming him.  There was 
uniform agreement that Delling was psychotic and delusional.  He was charged with first degree 
murder.  Idaho was one of the first states to abolish the insanity defense in the wake of Hinckley.  
State law did permit the defendant to introduce evidence of mental disorder to negate mens rea, 
the so-called mens rea alternative to the insanity defense.  In this case, however, there was no doubt 
that rather than negating the mens rea of intent, Delling’s severe mental disorder gave him reason 
to form it.  After all, his delusional beliefs led him to kill the victims on purpose to save his own 
life.  In the event, Delling pleaded guilty to second degree murder, but the trial judge who accepted 
taking the plea and imposed sentence noted the following: 
I don't believe that the defendant has the ability to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law. I do not believe it existed at the time he committed the offenses. I do think that 
 
31 Ibid. at 770-71 
32 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020). 
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he was in such a severe grip of his delusions that he would not have conformed his 
conduct to the law, and I do think the crimes do arise directly from his illness.33 
In other words, although Delling formed the mens rea and was fully guilty under Idaho law, 
in the judge’s opinion, Delling was legally insane.  The facts were perfect to test whether 
Idaho’s abolition of legal insanity and adoption of only the mens rea alternative were 
unconstitutional.  Delling appealed on that ground and asked the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari (discretionary review). 
In the United States Supreme Court, it takes the vote of only 4 of the 9 justices for the 
Court to grant review.  The Court declined to hear the case, 6-3.34  Although written dissents 
to denials of cert. are relatively infrequent, Justice Breyer filed one that was joined by 
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor.35 In his argument that review should have been granted, 
Justice Breyer noted the long, virtually uniform acceptance of an affirmative defense of 
legal insanity and the criticisms that the mens rea alternative was not adequate because it 
would convict defendants who would otherwise be found insane and because mental 
disorder seldom negates mens rea.  The constitutional status of the insanity defense 
remained an open question. 
On the evening of November 28, 2009, James Kraig Kahler entered the home of his 
former grandmother-in-law and shot and killed his former wife, his two daughters, and the 
wife’s grandmother.  Kahler was charged with capital murder.  Prior to the killings, the 
Kahlers had seemed to be a ‘perfect” family, but infidelity and other factors caused the 
marriage to disintegrate and to end in divorce.  Kahler had been leading an exemplary 
personal life as a family man and a professional life as an engineer and city manager.  As his 
personal life deteriorated, so did Kahler.  He had been fired from his job and was living at 
his family’s Kansas farm.  On the evening of the homicides, Kahler was angry at his ex-
wife.  He had had custody of his son and they were having a good time.  Kahler called his 
ex-wife and asked if he could extend the son’s stay for a day.  She refused, and while Kahler 
was doing an errand, she came by Kahler’s residence and took the son away with her.  
Kahler then obtained the weapon, went to the homicide scene and shot his victims. 
Like Idaho, Kansas had abolished the affirmative defense of legal insanity and 
adopted the mens rea rule.  Like Delling, there was little doubt that Kahler planned the 
homicides and formed the intent to kill.  Unlike Delling, however, for whom the evidence of 
gross loss of contact with reality was overwhelming, Kahler was not obviously crazy.  
Nevertheless, he had been examined by a psychiatrist who concluded that Kahler suffered 
from a number of mental disorders, including a major mental disorder, severe depression. As a 
result, the expert opined, Kahler’s perception and judgment were so distorted that he may have 
become dissociated from reality at the time of the crime.  The expert also testified that Kahler 
 
33 Brief for Respondent in the Supreme Court of Idaho,  Idaho v. John Joseph Delling. Nos. 36920 & 36921, at 3-4 
(2010). 
 
34 Full disclosure: Professor Richard J. Bonnie of the University of Virginia and I wrote an amicus brief urging the 
Court to grant review on behalf of a large number of criminal and mental health law professors.  Such “friend of the 
court” briefs are meant to advise the Court’s decision making. 
35 Delling v. Idaho, 133 S. Ct. 504 (2012). 
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could not refrain from his conduct.   Severe depression can have psychotic features, but 
distorted perceptions and judgment do not necessarily rise to that level.  Moreover, Delling’s 
motivating reason for forming the intent to kill—the need to save his own life—might have 
been a justification if true, whereas Kahler’s actions were arguably an anger-driven reaction 
that had no justification whatsoever.  Nevertheless, if Kansas did have an insanity defense, 
Kahler’s expert testimony would have been sufficient to raise a jury issue and to warrant an 
instruction.   
Because an insanity defense was not available and Kahler’s conduct met the criteria for 
capital murder, his conviction for the most serious crime in the criminal law was improperly a 
foregone conclusion.  He had no realistic prospect of exculpation.  Kahler was convicted of 
capital murder and appealed on the ground that the Kansas law abolishing the insanity 
defense was unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.36 Justice Kagan 
wrote the majority opinion upholding the Kansas law 6-3, with Justice Breyer once again in 
dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. 
Recall that the Court has repeatedly held that history is a prime guide to the analysis 
of whether a rule “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of 
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”  As a result, a large part of both opinions was 
devoted to consideration of the earlier cases and authoritative commentaries concerning the 
relation of mental disorder to culpability.  Unsurprisingly each claimed the history supported 
their own opinion.  I claim that analysis of the history is clouded by the authorities’ loose 
language that often left unclear whether the mens rea required by the prima facie case or the 
affirmative defense of legal insanity was being referred to.  The clear distinction between the two 
in legal writing did not emerge until recently, however, and even the Supreme Court conflates 
the two as it did in Clark and would do in Kahler.  The more important observation about the 
history, however, is that everyone concedes that some form of an insanity defense has existed in 
English law since the 1300s and everywhere in American law since the founding until Hinckley.  
Even as of the year of the opinion, 2020, only 4 states have effectively abolished the defense.  It 
is hard to imagine that anyone could characterize the ubiquity of legal insanity as anything other 
than a fundamental principle of justice rooted in our history and tradition.  But the majority did 
just that, in part because a number of unclear historical sources were read as if they reasonably 
led to the contrary result. 
The majority’s traditional legal analysis began with the correct observation noted in 
Clark that there is much variation in the tests various jurisdictions use for legal insanity and no 
formulation is or ever has been “canonical.”  As a result, the petitioner had a heavy burden to 
convince the Court that at a minimum, the Constitution compels adoption of some form of the 
moral capacity prong of M’Naghten (the knowing right from wrong prong).  Although the 
dissent conceded that no particular test was required, the majority seems on firm ground when it 
claimed that the dissent’s analysis in fact accepted the moral incapacity test as a minimum 
requirement.37  
 
36 Full disclosure:  Professor Bonnie and I again co-authored an amicus brief on behalf of 290 criminal and mental 
health law professors, arguing that the Kansas law was unconstitutional.  Amicus briefs arguing against the law were 
also submitted by the American Bar Association and a group of philosophers.  
37 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1030, n.5 
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This was probably a strategic error on the dissent’s part, but it is not clear that it would 
have made a difference because the majority claimed that Kansas’ mens rea rule in fact adopted 
the “cognitive” prong of M’Naghten (nature and quality of the act).38  The dissent argument 
about abolition is thus eviscerated because Kansas allegedly had not abolished the insanity 
defense and the Court did not need to address whether outright abolition was constitutional.  That 
question was left open.39  The Court further argued that Kansas had decided that moral 
culpability was captured by the “nature and quality” prong indirectly expressed through the mens 
rea rule.  Consequently, Kansas’ scheme was not untethered from judgments about moral 
culpability.40  The Court noted that the Kansas moral judgement rule might differ from the 
dissent’s or from many of the justices and other jurisdictions, but Kansas was constitutionally 
entitled to make that judgement without judicial interference.  Further, the dissent was wrong to 
claim that jurisdictions retain leeway concerning the content of the standard because they are free 
to go beyond the minimum moral capacity standard.  But again, why should that be the canonical 
minimum.  Jurisdictional freedom is indeed abridged.  If the defendant lacked moral capacity, 
that does not eliminate culpability in Kansas, it simply diminishes it, the majority argued.  Such 
considerations can be addressed at sentencing, which is clearly permitted in the Kansas scheme.  
Indeed, if the reason for moral incapacity, such as major mental disorder, requires diversion to 
inpatient psychiatric care, Kansas also directly permits this outcome. 
The majority’s reasoning is facially attractive, but it is massively flawed.  The Kansas 
rule is not the equivalent of the cognitive prong of M’Naghten because it is much narrower 
depending on how the “nature and quality” of one’s actions is interpreted.  A defendant may 
know what he or she is doing in a narrow sense.  Consider Andrea Yates again.  She knew the 
victims were her children and that she was causing their biological death by drowning them.  
Please recall that she delusionally believed that she was saving them from eternal torment by 
Satan in hell.  That was her material motivation for her action.  She clearly formed the mens rea 
for premeditated, intentional homicide, but did she know what she was doing in any sensible 
sense?  Defendant’s virtually never mistake their victim for a lemon or a dog, the silly examples 
used by the MPC and the Kahler dissent respectively.  Few if any insanity claimants are 
acquitted by the factual cognitive prong.  To the extent that any insanity rule is meant to express 
a moral judgment, the cognitive prong fails to do so.  If the “nature and quality” is interpreted 
more broadly, as I just suggested, then the cognitive prong does become a genuine moral 
standard, but note that Ms. Yates would have been convicted under the Kansas mens rea rule 
because, unlike the “nature and quality” standard,  the Kansas mens rea alternative does not 
permit a broad interpretation.  Mens rea is defined narrowly.  The defendant did or did not form 
it, and in almost all cases, even the most abnormal defendants will form it, as the dissent clearly 
recognized and powerfully argued.  No jurisdiction has ever adopted solely the cognitive prong 
as its insanity rule because essentially no one would ever be acquitted under this standard.  
Kansas has effectively abolished the insanity defense despite the majority’s slippery claim to the 
contrary. 
The ability of the judge to consider moral incapacity at sentencing and to commit the 
convicted felon to psychiatric care do not cure the central moral defect of the Kansas scheme.  
 
38 Ibid. at  1026 .  The majority claimed without support that everyone agreed to this, but as we shall see, it is an 
unjustified claim. 
39 Ibid. at 1031, n. 6. 
40 Ibid. at 1031, n. 7. 
12 
 
Conviction of a defendant who is morally innocent is legally and morally objectionable.  A just 
criminal law would not permit this.  The acquitted defendant is not stigmatized and blamed as a 
criminal, and the conditions of confinement should be required to be less onerous than prison.  
But Kansas judges are not required to take mental abnormality into account at sentencing or to 
order psychiatric care.  Doing so is entirely discretionary, even in cases that seem to demand 
such actions. 
For good measure, Kansas advanced the claim that the insanity defense is too hard and 
confusing for adequate jury assessment, but if the Court is correct that the mens rea rule is really 
a form of insanity defense, then mens rea evaluation faces the same difficulties.  In addition to 
this logical flaw, the empirics of Kansas’ claim were refuted by both the dissent and by the law 
professors’ amicus brief.   Of course it is difficult to reconstruct past mental states, but the 
insanity defense is adjudicated in 46 states and the federal jurisdiction without undue difficulty.  
Even those four states permit such reconstruction for purposes of sentencing.  And there is no 
evidence whatsoever that it is more difficult to assess past mental disorder than past mens rea.  In 
my experience as a practicing forensic psychologist, I would claim the opposite is true.  The 
gross mental abnormality typically needed for a successful insanity claim is easier to evaluate 
than mens rea because it is so gross and obvious in most cases. 
The majority opinion concluded by noting that psychiatry is an inexact science and thus 
courts should be reluctant to intrude in the fraught relation between mental disorder and criminal 
culpability.  
Defining the precise relationship between criminal culpability and mental illness involves 
examining the workings of the brain, the purposes of the criminal law, the ideas of free 
will and responsibility. It is a project demanding hard choices among values, in a context 
replete with uncertainty, even at a single moment in time.  And it is a project, if any is, 
that should be open to revision over time, as new medical knowledge emerges and as 
legal and moral norms evolve.  Which is all to say that it is a project for state governance, 
not constitutional law.41 
The Court is correct that the content of the test is a project for state governance, but wrong to 
imply that a state can constitutionally do without at least some affirmative defense of legal 
insanity.  Moreover, at present, the working of the brain need not be examined to understand the 
behavior of defendants and to decide how the law should respond to particular behaviors, such as 
gross loss of contact with reality.  Even if we could “read” the content of mental states from 
knowing the subject’s brain states, which is entirely a fantasy, it would not entail how the law 
should respond because behavior, not the brain, is crucial to responsibility assessment.  Finally, 
the metaphysical concept of free will is not a criterion in criminal law nor even foundational for 
it.42 
 
41 Ibid at 1037 




 In conclusion, it is now constitutional to effectively abolish the insanity defense.  No state 
has done so, however, since the original four states did so decades ago.43  One hopes that no 
further jurisdictions will follow these examples. 
Substantive and Procedure Since Hinckley 
 This section of the paper first considers the substantive law of legal insanity since 
Hinckley.  As we shall see there have been few changes since the changes immediately post-
Hinckley.  Then it turns to the procedures associated with legal insanity. 
 Substance 
 There have been few substantive changes since the general tightening of the tests in the 
wake of Hinckley.  Some variant of M’Naghten is by far the dominant rule.  There continue to be 
skirmishes over its interpretation, especially about whether “wrong” means legal or moral wrong.  
The states are split on this issue and some have given no definitive answer.  The four abolitionist 
states have continued to reject the affirmative defense.  A minority of states continue to include a 
control test.  The unique New Hampshire doctrine simply acquits a defendant if he was “insane” 
at the time of the crime.44 
 In the federal courts, most cases are on habeas corpus appeal from state convictions for 
very serious crimes, such as capital murder and murder.  Most of the claims are for some variant 
of ineffective assistance of counsel or other non-substantive failures.  Such claimants face a legal 
challenge because Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA) in 1996,45 which applies to all federal petitions for habeas corpus filed on or after its 
effective date. Title I of AEDPA substantially changed the way federal courts handle habeas 
corpus actions. A state prisoner may not obtain relief with respect to any claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim, 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 
or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.46 




43 Some believe that Alaska did so in 2018 because it adopted the mens rea alternative.  AS §12.47.020.  At the same 
time, however, it also adopted an affirmative defense of legal insanity.  AS §12.47.010. 
44 N.H.S. A. §628.2.  This test relies on common law precedents dating from the late 19th C. to determine if a 
defendant was insane.  For example, if a defendant committed an act that would be criminal if he were sane, but the 
act was the product of mental disease, the defendant should be found insane. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 402 (1869).  
The federal court in Durham that adopted the much-discussed but later rejected “product” test, thought it was 
adopting New Hampshire’s rule, but in fact there were differences.  John Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire 
Doctrine of Legal Insanity, 69 Yale L. J. 367 (1960). 
45 Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217. 
46 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA. A decision on the merits means a substantive and not procedural 
claim.  AEDPA was not a response to Hinckley, to be sure.  It was an attempt to make habeas corpus appeals more 
efficient.  Nonetheless, since it was passed, it has had a large impact on appeals of convictions in insanity defense 
casesand related issues. 
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The state cases are similar to those in the federal courts.  The dominant M’Naghten test 
has a surfeit of common law history, even in those jurisdictions that abandoned it in favor of the 
MPC rule in the middle of the 20th Century.  Thus, there are few surprises concerning the 
interpretation of the content of the test.  Most involve questions regarding sufficiency of the 
evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel and like claims.  In short, there has been little 
substantive activity since the post-Hinckley legislative changes. 
 
Every now and then, an unusual case comes along, but it is not representative of any 
trend.  For example, in the wake of Hinckley, the State of California jettisoned the MPC test for 
legal insanity and opted for a traditional M’Naghten rule with the amendment that the two prongs 
were now conjunctive, separated by “and,” rather than traditionally disjunctive, separated by 
“or.”  In other words, a defendant could be found legally insane only if the defendant both didn’t 
know the nature and quality of the act and did not know it was wrong.  In People v. Skinner, the 
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the California legislation.47  A number of the 
Court’s assumptions are noteworthy.  Although conceding that the United States Supreme Court 
had never ruled that a state must adopt some insanity defense, the Court inferred from Supreme 
Court jurisprudence that it was probably required.  Also, the California history of the insanity 
defense was complicated, but the traditional California M’Naghten rule before the MPC test was 
adopted was disjunctive, as was traditional everywhere.  Finally, the conjunctive California test 
was massively narrow, indeed so narrow that few could succeed because few defendants would 
not know the nature and quality of their acts narrowly conceived.  With these assumptions, the 
Court further assumed that the conjunctive test might be unconstitutional.  To save its 
constitutionality,  interpretation of the legislation was therefore required, and the Court opined 
the legislature must have made a simple drafting error, mistakenly using “and” instead of “or.”  
Consequently, the Court ruled the test must be interpreted to be disjunctive and found it 
constitutional.  Now the California Supreme Court’s creativity is often remarked upon, but this is 
a remarkable example.  Such cases are rare, however. 
Starting in the State of Michigan in the middle 1970s, between 15 and 20  states have 
adopted the “Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict” (GBMI) in addition to existing rules of legal 
insanity.  It is an alternative, not a replacement.  Although the first adoptions antedate Hinckley, 
the vast majority of jurisdictions have adopted GBMI since Hinckley and it is now a substantial 
minority rule. 
A GBMI verdict does not indicate reduced culpability, it does not require lesser punishment, and it 
does not provide for hospitalization and treatment that would not otherwise be available to the convict.  
Essentially, the finder of fact is being asked to make a diagnosis in addition to a guilt determination.  It is 
not different from “guilty but herpes.”  In short, GBMI is a fraudulent verdict because it does not address 
any issue relevant to just criminal blame and punishment and it has the potential to deflect juries from 
proper insanity acquittals because they do not understand the insanity defense or fear that it will cause the 
release of a dangerous offender.48  When GBMI is available, jurors may falsely believe that they are “taking 
account” of the defendant’s impairment and thus may improperly return the GBMI verdict when an acquittal 
of insanity was appropriate.  Paradoxically, defendants who raise the verdict may receive even harsher 
sentences, so there is evidence that its use is declining.49   
 
47 People v. Skinner, 704 P. 2d 752 (1985). 






The standard rule in the United States is that an insanity defense cannot be imposed on a 
competent, unwilling defendant,50 and, of course, all defendants must be competent to plead.  
Defendants who are incompetent to plead or to stand trial may not do so.51  This is as it should be 
because the decision may be momentous for the defendant’s future.  As we shall see when 
discussing post-insanity acquittal procedures below, in many jurisdictions, a successful insanity 
defense may result in incarceration in a secure forensic facility for longer than the prison term for 
the crime charged.  In other jurisdictions, the defendant may be committed to a secure forensic 
facility that is little different from a prison for as long as the prison term permitted.  Release in 
both cases depends largely on the discretion of the facility’s professional staff because judges are 
inclined to trust their judgment about whether release is safe.  A competent defendant might well 
want to forego a potential insanity defense and should be permitted to do so. 
Although in general the “playing field” in criminal prosecutions is not “level” between 
the prosecution and the defense, it would be unfair to the prosecution to permit the defendant to 
raise an insanity defense only at trial and to prevent the prosecution from appointing its own 
expert to evaluate a defendant who will raise the insanity defense.  As a result, defendants are 
required to give advance notice to the prosecution that an insanity defense will be raised and to 
make the defendant available for evaluation by a prosecution expert.52  Failure to do so will 
prevent the defendant from raising the insanity defense.53  An issue rarely raised is what the 
remedy should be if the defendant refuses to cooperate with the prosecution’s expert.  There are 
so few cases that it is difficult to state a general rule, but the dominant view seems to be similar 
to the consequence of not giving advance notice: the defense is barred.  Another approach, for 
example, is to permit raising the defense, but using only lay evidence, which all defendants are 
entitled to do if they wish.  Such cases are very rare.  Most defendants cooperate.   
Experts are usually indispensable to help prepare the case and testify for defendants who wish 
to raise an insanity defense.  Without such an expert, the playing field is exceedingly unlevel.  Very 
many criminal defendants in the United States are indigent and cannot afford to retain an expert.  
Moreover, the budgets of public defenders are rarely sufficient to afford adequate expert 
assistance.  Consequently, many jurisdictions provided indigent defendants with an expert, but the 
Supreme Court had never ruled that this was a necessity, unlike the provision of an attorney in 
serious cases.  A few years after Hinckley, in Ake v. Oklahoma,54 the Supreme Court held that such 
assistance was constitutionally required in insanity and death penalty cases.  In Ake v. Oklahoma,55 
the Supreme Court finally recognized the unfairness of not providing the defendant with a mental 
health expert.  It noted that fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to an adequate 
 
50 E.g., US v. Marble, 940 F. 2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (basing the decision on the Insanity Defense Reform Act). 
The Court did note that if the defendant gave no clear indication about this issue, the Court might give an instruction 
on the insanity defense sua sponte, but I assume such cases would be rare.  Most competent defendants can express a 
simple choice. 
51 See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993)(defendant must be competent to plead guilty and to waive the 
right to counsel); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) (defendant must be competent to stand trial). 
52 E.g., Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, §12.2. 
53 Ibid. 
54 470 U.S. 68 (1985).  In practice, the decision has been extended to also obtain in mens rea cases. 
55 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
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opportunity to present their claims.56  The Court further held that a mental health expert is 
necessary when the defendant needs expert assistance at capital sentencing hearings to rebut expert 
predictions of dangerousness.57  As the Court held, 
the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who 
will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation 
of the defense. This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional 
right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Our 
concern is that the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist for the purpose 
we have discussed, and as in the case of the provision of counsel we leave to the States the 
decision on how to implement this right.58   
The decision is correct, but it left open important questions.   
The problem is how the right has been implemented in many jurisdictions.  Ake has not been 
interpreted to guarantee the defendant a mental health professional that the defense chooses.59  If 
a defendant has resources, he can “shop around” to try to obtain a mental health professional who 
will support his claims, but indigent defendants do not have that ability.60  If the professional 
consulted will not render a favorable opinion, the defendant’s mental health-based argument will 
almost certainly fail.  In some jurisdictions with a sizeable number of forensic professionals, some 
experts may have a reputation for being favorable to the defense and the problem may be somewhat 
alleviated.  There is no guarantee, however, that even a favorably inclined forensic professional 
will reach the expected conclusion, and the possibility of using a predisposed expert may not arise 
in jurisdictions with fewer forensic specialists.  What is worse, in some jurisdictions an indigent 
defendant may be assigned a mental health professional who is an employee of the state and the 
prosecution may immediately have access to the report.61  A state employee inevitably has a 
conflict of interest.  The indigent defendant should be entitled to an independent professional, as 
some jurisdictions, including a majority of the federal circuits, hold.62  Of course, an indigent 
defendant should not be entitled to shop around indefinitely for a genuine defense expert, but in 
my opinion at least a second opinion should be required given what is at stake. 
The Supreme Court had a perfect opportunity to clarify the issue, but avoided doing so in 
McWilliams v. Dunn.63  McWilliams held that the defense had not received the minimum assistance 
necessary under any interpretation of Ake because it had not had sufficient access to an available 
expert.  Consequently, the Court overturned his conviction and noted that they had no need to 
decide the broader question of whether Ake required an expert who is not only independent of the 
prosecution, but also who would be part of the defense team.  The Court should have ruled that the 
defendant is entitled to a genuinely independent evaluator, but that does not go far enough. The 
expert should not be an employee of the state.  Further, the independent expert’s report should not 
be disclosed to the prosecution unless the defendant decides to go forward with a mental health-
based argument.  An independent expert’s report should be confidential work product unless the 
claim is raised.  The fruits of an evaluation of a potential claim should not be of benefit to the 
prosecution 
 
56 Ibid. at 77. 
57 Ibid. at 83–84. 
58 Ibid. at 83. 
59 E.g., United States v. Osoba, 213 F. 3d 913 (6th Cir. 2000). 
60 Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. 
61 Granviel v. Texas, 495 U.S. 963, 963–64 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
62  JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY, 131-132 (2009). 




Virtually all jurisdictions permit experts on both sides to offer an opinion about the ultimate 
legal issue—whether the defendant is legally sane or insane—but the federal jurisdiction is a 
notable exception.  The expert cannot give an ultimate legal opinion in federal legal insanity 
cases.64 This innovation was adopted by the Insanity Defense Reform Act in the wake of 
Hinckley.  The thinking behind it is that the ultimate legal issue is just that, a legal issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact, and therefore beyond the expertise of mental health experts.  When 
experts give such opinions, jurors may be misled into thinking that the issue is medical or 
psychological.  Here is an example.  After the Hinckley verdict, some jurors stated that if the 
experts couldn’t agree on his legal sanity, how could the jurors.65  I am a long-time proponent of 
this limitation on expert testimony, but proponents have had little success. 
The traditional rule after the case is tried is that legal insanity is a jury question and the 
jury is free to credit or disregard any expert of lay testimony.  As a result, jury verdicts are 
seldom overturned even if the defense experts are unanimous that the defendant was legally 
insane and the prosecution uses only lay testimony and cross-examination of the defence experts 
to defeat the insanity plea.  In egregious cases, the trial judge or an appellate tribunal may decide 
that the verdict is so inconsistent with the weight of the evidence that the jury verdict will be 
overturned.  Such cases are rare, however. 
An interesting, oft-raised issue is whether the trial judge should instruct the jury 
concerning the consequences of finding the defendant legally insane, namely, some form of 
involuntary commitment to a secure forensic mental health facility, including indefinite 
confinement in some jurisdictions.  In Shannon v. United States,66 the Court held that federal trial 
courts need not instruct the jury about commitment unless the prosecution affirmatively misleads 
the jury about the consequences.  Justice Thomas’s majority opinion focused primarily on the 
traditional assumption that juries should decide whether the defendant is culpable and should not 
be concerned with the consequences of their verdict.67  Although this assumption may make 
sense for the vast majority of cases in which the defendant will be imprisoned or freed depending 
on the verdict—a fact jurors know—the insanity defense is the only form of exculpation that 
does not result in the defendant being immediately freed.  I recognize that jurors may not fully 
understand what sentence will follow a conviction, but the insanity defense is sui generis 
because the acquitted defendant is not freed.  It would be understandable if a juror voted to 
convict a legally insane defendant because the juror feared that a disordered and dangerous 
person might be freed.  Similarly, jurors may be far more inclined to reach the just result if they 
learn that the insanity acquittee will be preventively detained by post-acquittal commitment, 
which will be discussed presently.  Thus, I conclude that the defendant should be entitled to a 
“consequences” instruction upon request.  I would not make it mandatory because, as Justice 
Thomas recognized, there may be situations when the defendant would think it is not in his 
interest to have the jury learn of the consequences. 
 
64 Federal Rules of Evidence, §704(b). 
65 “Verdict was unjust': 2 jurors,” Chicago Tribune,; Jun 23, 1982, pg. A1 
66 512 U.S. 573 (1994).  This was not a constitutional decision.  It was issued under the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority 
over the procedures used in federal cases. 
67 Ibid. at 579–80, 586–887. In fact, Justice Thomas’ entire majority opinion relies on the validity of this assumption. 
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In all jurisdictions, a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity may be automatically civilly 
committed, either for an evaluation that will be followed by formal civil commitment, or by formal 
commitment itself without a prior evaluation.68  Although not punishment for crime—the 
defendant has been acquitted after all—these civil commitments have been justified because the 
defendant is allegedly still dangerous and not responsible for the condition.  The terms of such 
possible commitments vary across jurisdictions, but in some jurisdictions the term may be 
indefinite with periodic review.  In Jones v. United States,69 the Supreme Court upheld both an 
automatic commitment for evaluation and the potentially indefinite commitment of a defendant 
acquitted by reason of insanity for shoplifting a leather jacket.  The Court argued that, based on an 
insanity acquittal, it is rational to presume that the subject was still mentally disordered and 
dangerous.70  The Court was unwilling to equate “dangerousness” with violence.  It claimed that 
the legislative purpose to confine was the same for violent and nonviolent offenses and that the 
former often led to the latter.71  Moreover, for this type of commitment, the Court was willing to 
accept a lesser burden of persuasion than the constitutionally-imposed standard civil commitment 
standard of clear and convincing evidence.72  Post-insanity commitments are different, the Court 
claimed, because the defendant himself raised the issue of mental disorder, and so the risk of error 
is decreased.73   
Finally, the Court approved potentially indefinite confinement on the ground that such 
confinement did bear a rational relation to the purpose of the commitment, which is to confine 
dangerous, non-responsible agents.  The defendant was acquitted so the length of the confinement 
need not be limited by the deserved punishment.  The subject is properly confined as long the 
defendant remains disordered and dangerous and need not be released until either condition is no 
longer met.  This might happen at any time, or never.74  In Foucha v. Louisiana,75 the Court 
affirmed that a post-insanity commitment must end if the subject is no longer mentally ill, even if 
he is still dangerous.76 
 
68 See JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY, 168-170 (2009). 
69 463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
70 Ibid. at 365. 
71 See id. at 365 n.14. 
72 Ibid. at 367–68; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431–33 (1979) (holding that traditional civil 
commitment required a finding by clear and convincing evidence, a standard between a preponderance and beyond a 
reasonable doubt). 
73 Jones, 463 U.S. at 367. 
74 Ibid. at 368–69. 
75 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
76 Ibid. at 81.  Justice O’Connor partially concurred.  She noted that an insanity acquittee had been found to have 
committed the prima facie case beyond a reasonable doubt.  She then wrote cryptically, as follows: 
It might therefore be permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquittee who has regained sanity [sic] if, 
unlike the situation in this case, the nature and duration of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public 
safety concerns related to the acquittee’s continuing dangerousness . . . .   [A]cquittees could not be confined as 
mental patients absent some medical justification for doing so; in such a case the necessary connection between 
the nature and purposes of confinement would be absent. 
Ibid. at 87–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor also noted that the seriousness of the crime should also 
affect whether the state’s interest in continued confinement would be strong enough.  See id. at 88. 
 If the subject is no longer mentally disordered and therefore no longer non-responsible, it is hard to imagine what 
possible “medical justification” there could be for continuing civil commitment to protect the public.  It is not clear 
from the O’Connor concurrence if she would require some finding of mental abnormality, as did the statute upheld in 
Kansas v. Hendricks, to make the commitment analogous to traditional civil commitment.  521 U.S. 346, 355 (1997).  
If not, however, then five justices of the Supreme Court, the four Foucha dissenters and Justice O’Connor, would have been 
willing to countenance pure preventive detention, at least of a person who had committed a crime without being responsible and 
who continued to be dangerous. 
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I think that the Court was correct to decouple the potential length of the civil commitment 
from the sentence for the crime charged.  The defendant has been acquitted and the usual 
justifications for a sentence length do not apply.  Roughly, the legislature sets sentences that are 
proportionate to culpability and that reflect an ordinary, rational offender’s dangerousness.  The 
insanity acquittee is neither culpable nor dangerous in the ordinary manner, however.  If the basis 
for the commitment is non-responsible dangerousness, the commitment can justifiably continue 
until these conditions are no longer met.  Although this is true as a theoretical matter, it seems 
useless to have lengthy commitments for nonviolent offenders.  They do not present much danger 
and the risk that they will be erroneously held longer than necessary is substantial.  I would have 
limited terms of confinement for non-violent acquittees.  These could be longer than ordinary 
involuntary civil commitment terms because the acquittee was prima facie guilty of a criminal 
offense, which is seldom the case in involuntary civil commitment and never required.77  
Nonetheless, the terms of post-insanity commitment for nonviolent offenders should be short.  
Even for those acquitted for crimes of violence, if the subject has a clean disciplinary record in the 
hospital for a substantial period of time, he should be released at the end of the period or the state 
can seek ordinary involuntary civil commitment.  Another possibility is conditional or 
probationary release.78  If the acquittee has an unproblematic probationary period in the 
community, the commitment should end. 
The Court in Jones never noted that the mental disorder and dangerousness had to be linked 
to ensure that the subject was not responsible for his dangerousness.79  After all, non-responsibility 
for the legally relevant behavior, in this case dangerousness, is necessary to justify involuntary 
commitment.  It is possible for a person to be independently crazy and bad, with no link between 
them suggesting that the defendant’s dangerousness is irrational.  For example, a defendant may 
be wildly jealous because he delusionally believes that his partner has been unfaithful and might 
have some form of mitigation if he attacked the partner, but there will be no excuse if he robs a 
bank.80  There probably will be such a link in most cases of insanity acquittal, but it cannot be 
taken for granted empirically. 
More important, there is reason to doubt the Court’s presumption of continuing mental 
disorder and dangerousness.  By definition, the defendant must have been sufficiently rational to 
be competent to stand trial.  If that state of rational capacity continues, then it is not clear that he 
continues to be mentally ill for the purpose of involuntary commitment.  Moreover, to the extent 
that the mental disorder played a causal role in the practical reasoning that accompanied the 
offense, it is perfectly possible that the defendant is no longer dangerous either.  This will be 
 
 For an attempt to apply Justice O’Connor’s suggestion, see State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d 94, 109 (Wis. 1995) (permitting 
continued confinement if there were a medical justification and the subject was still dangerous, but limiting the term to the 
maximum sentence for the crime charged).  Needless to say, I believe that this practice is simply criminal punishment by other 
means.  The “medical justification” criterion is a transparent and fraudulent attempt to bring this type of commitment within the 
disease justification for preemptive confinement. The limitation on the term of the commitment to the maximum term for the crime 
charged is simply a salve to the legislative conscience and a signal that the continued commitment is punitive. 
77 See JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 476-77 (2009) (discussing 
the criteria for commitments for dangerousness, which do not include a finding of prima facie guilt for a criminal offense or the 
equivalent thereof).  In my experience, seriously violent conduct is virtually always processed through the criminal justice system.  
Moreover, traditional civil commitment requires only the lower, clear and convincing burden of persuasion.  Addington v Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979). 
78 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(e)–(f) (West 2010). 
79 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363–65 (1983) (discussing the need for a showing of both mental disorder and 
dangerousness to justify these commitments and apparently assuming that the fact of an insanity acquittal supplies a link between 
the two criteria, but not explicitly requiring the causal link at the time of commitment). 
80 I recognize that a narrow interpretation of the standards for legal insanity would not excuse the person because he would 
neither be justified nor excused if the facts were as he believed them to be.  On a broader reading, however, the defendant is not a 
rational agent and might have a plausible claim for legal insanity.  
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especially possible if the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion on legal insanity and the 
defendant only needs to cast a reasonable doubt about his sanity.  Even if the defendant bears the 
burden of persuasion, as is commonly the case at present, the considerations just adduced apply. 
My suggestion, therefore, is that all post-acquittal commitments should be for evaluation only 
and should not be for full commitment. There is little need to deprive the defendant of more liberty 
to protect the public.  Preventive commitment should occur only if the evaluation indicates that 
the criteria for commitment are met at present.  The evaluations need not last more than a few 
weeks.  That is more than sufficient for the state’s mental health professionals to reach a 
conclusion.  I once again think that a subject facing potentially indefinite commitment and those 
facing substantial limited terms should be entitled to the services of an independent mental health 
professional to help defend against the commitment.  Without such help, they have essentially no 
chance if the state’s professional recommends commitment.  These forms of commitment are more 
onerous than ordinary involuntary commitment and fairness requires that insanity acquittees 
should have a chance to avoid long-term incarceration in secure forensic facilities.  For the same 
reason, the State should have to prove the commitment criteria by the higher, clear and convincing 
standard that Addington imposed for ordinary involuntary commitment to avoid imposing too 




 Since the wave of changes to insanity tests and procedure in the wake of Hinckley there has 
been little substantive change in the test for legal insanity.  Only the procedural change of shifting 
the burden of persuasion to the defendant seems to have been outcome determinative.  In contrast, 
there have been considerable further procedural changes.  The Supreme Court unjustifiably held 
that jurisdictions were constitutionally permitted to effectively abolish the insanity defense, but 
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